ARINDAM SINHA, J.
In this case, the petitioner had approached the Court after an order passed by the Supreme Court. The facts of the case were that the petitioner had a grievance against a letter dated 27th September 2013, whereby a bank guarantee of Rs.70,00,000/- was encashed and a further sum of Rs.51,47,704.97 was demanded. The Supreme Court observed that it would be open to the petitioner to challenge the validity of the said letter by filing a writ petition before the High Court.
The petitioner was required to furnish a bank guarantee of Rs.70 lakhs with a corresponding direction to the opposite party to release the asset in favour of the petitioner. The bank guarantee was furnished and there was also reciprocal release. Subsequently, the opposite party encashed the bank guarantee and claimed the further sum. It was against this aggregate claim of bank guarantee value and further sum that the petitioner was before the Court. Thus, the issue was whether conditions in the release letter imposed under an interim direction made in the writ petition survived the dismissal of the writ petition itself.
The Court noted that there were monies claimed as outstanding in condition nos. (II) and (III) of the release letter. As per Condition no.(V) , the opposite party was to continue to have the first charge over the assets of the company till payment of all dues or till final orders in the writ petition. In order to ascertain the position, the Court stated that on checking the ‘No Due Certificate’, it was clear that the dues to the opposite parties were all paid and return of documents were without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the opposite parties. Thus, “the petitioner appears to have a claim that the bank guarantee was wrongfully invoked by opposite party, who says it has further residual claim against petitioner. Both parties have monetary claims against each other. Opposite Party cannot say it is secured creditor in respect of its residual claim. As such, parties are relegated to suit, to pursue their claims against each other”. The writ was thus disposed of.
The facts of the case were that the petitioner challenged an order dated 27th August 2021 passed by Commercial Court, Bhubaneswar, whereby the petitioner’s application under Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was rejected. The petitioner was ready to put in security as the Court would direct.
The Court stated that furnishing security is one of the conditions to be fulfilled for the Court to be satisfied in granting the stay and that the impugned order does not mention the conditions not having been fulfilled. It was stated in the impugned order that, in the event, there was execution and the petitioner succeeded, it could apply for restitution to recover the amount paid.
Thus, the High Court placed reliance on Bhaven Construction v. Executive engineer Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam (Civil Appeal no.14665 of 2015) and stated that the impugned order suffered from material irregularity and was illegal. Thus, the impugned order was set aside and quashed.
The facts of the case were that the petitioner was the purchaser of raiyati land from his vendor. That his vendor was raiyat in respect of the subject matter of the sale deed presented for registration was then beyond dispute, it having been settled by the Supreme Court in Kumar Bimal Chandra Sinha v. State of Orissa and others 1962 AIR 1912. The Supreme Court opined that the rent payable by the appellants as raiyats in respect of the disputed lands would form part of the assets which had to be included in the gross assets in determining compensation. Furthermore, it was observed that the appellant’s raiyati interests in the lands and the buildings standing on those lands should not have been affected by the abolition of his interest as proprietors and that the State authorities have had-illegally taken possession of those.
The issue in the case was to answer the claims against the arising of contention regarding power to refuse registration. The High Court in its order had categorically held that the provision contained in sub-Section 2 of Section 22-A of the Registration (Odisha Amendment) Act, 2013 nowhere requires the production of the record of rights in respect of the land transferred in the name of vendor or transferor, it simply requires the production of the records of rights for the satisfaction of the registering officer that such transferor has a right title and interest over the property so transferred. Therefore, it was clear that if the record of rights did not stand in the name of the transferor, he had to produce documents to the effect that the title flows to him to the satisfaction of the registering officer that the transferor had the right, title, and interest over the case land.
To the Court, it appeared by the provision that the Parliament gave the option to the person aggrieved by order of the Registrar, to file suit within thirty days after the making of refusal. The provision was more so an option because limitations for suits are provided by the Limitation Act, 1963. The Act of 1908 does not save the applicability of the provision from the operation of the Limitation Act, 1963. As such, the writ petition was maintainable. The Sub-Registrar and the Registrar had thus not disputed that subject matter of the sale deed were raiyati lands, contended to be so and upheld by the Supreme Court in Kumar Bimal Chandra Sinha v. State of Orissa and others AIR 1962 SC 1912. The writ petition succeeded. Impugned orders were set aside and quashed.