CASE TITLE : SRI BANSHIDHAR BAUG V. ORISSA HIGH COURT & ORS.
CASE NO : WP(C) NO. 14219 of 2022
DATE OF JUDGMENT : September 19, 2024

Permanent Committee for designation of Senior Advocates is not empowered to withhold/defer/reject candidature of certain Advocates by not placing them before the Full Court.

Mr. Banshidhar Baug, an Advocate having standing of about 43 years in the Bar filed this writ petition seeking a direction to the Permanent Committee for Designation of Senior Advocates, constituted under Rule 3(1) of the High Court of Orissa (Designation of Senior Advocate) Rules, 2019 [hereinafter ‘the 2019 Rules’], to submit his name along with a comprehensive assessment report to the Full Court for consideration of his candidature for designation as a ‘Senior Advocate’.

Initially, the petitioner had applied for such designation in the year 2013-14 but his application was deferred and while the matter stood thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down a set of elaborate guidelines for designation of Senior Advocates in the case of Ms. Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India through Secretary General & Ors, [2017] 10 SCR 478.

Pursuant to such guidelines, the 2019 Rules were framed and under such Rules, an advertisement was published by the Court on 22.04.2019 calling application from eligible candidates for designation as Senior Advocates. The petitioner alleged that before compliance of the procedure prescribed under Rule 6(3) of the 2019 Rules, some candidates were designated as Senior Advocates on 19.08.2019.

Being aggrieved by such designation of some candidates, the petitioner had challenged the same by filing a writ petition and the Court therein declared Rule 6(9) of the 2019 Rules as ultra vires but upheld designation of the Advocates, subject to fresh decision by the Full Court taking into account the candidatures of all the applicants.

Pursuant to such order, a notice was issued to the petitioner, along with other candidates, to appear before the Permanent Committee for fresh interaction as per Rule 6(5) of the 2019 Rules. The petitioner appeared before the Committee for interaction on 18.10.2019, but strangely his application was deferred on 23.10.2019.

The prime issue which arose for consideration was whether the Permanent Committee has the authority to withhold or defer an Advocate’s name from being submitted to the Full Court following the stage of interaction as prescribed by Rule 6(5) of the 2019 Rules and whether the Committee possesses the authority to exclude the names of certain Advocates from consideration based on the points they secured in the overall assessment.

The Court proceeded on to interpret the directive given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Indira Jaising (supra) which provided that all the names that are listed/cleared by the Permanent Committee will go to the Full Court. Thus, it held that discretion has been conferred upon the High Courts to frame rules and to carve out jurisdiction of Permanent Committees.

Interpreting Rule 6(6) of the 2019 Rules, the Court held that the same does not grant any authority to the Permanent Committee to set a cut-off score nor does it empower the Committee to forward only those names who meet such a cut-off. Therefore, it came to the conclusion that ultimate authority to designate Advocates as Senior Advocates lies with the Full Court and thus, the Permanent Committee cannot withhold/defer/reject names without forwarding the same to the Full Court.

Resultantly, the Court disposed of the writ petition holding that the withholding of candidature of the petitioner by the Committee was illegal and thus, the petitioner was directed to submit a fresh application within two weeks and upon receipt of such application, the Committee was directed to conduct an overall assessment and submit the petitioner’s name to the Full Court along with its assessment report.

CASE TITLE : DR. KANISHKA DAS V. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
CASE NO : WP(C) NO. 14616 of 2021
DATE OF JUDGMENT : October 04, 2024

It is not mandatory to give opportunity of hearing to delinquent employee in a ‘Fact Finding Inquiry’.

The petitioner Dr. Kanishka Das was working as the Head of the Department (HOD) in the Department of Pediatric Surgery, AIIMS, Bhubaneswar. While posted as such, some complaints were made against him for which a Fact Finding Committee (FFC) was constituted to ascertain the facts.

The FFC submitted its report and on the basis of such report, a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner. Being aggrieved by issuance of show-cause notice, he approached the Central Administrative Tribunal impugning both the show-cause notice as well as the FFC report.

However, the Tribunal did not find any fault either with the FFC report or the show-cause notice. Rather, it ordered the respondent authorities to provide relevant documents to the petitioner, if he seeks the same. Impugning such order of the Tribunal, the petitioner filed this writ petition.

The Court held that a person can challenge the show-cause notice in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, if it is ex facie within its jurisdiction. It can be challenged if the issuance of show-cause is per se arbitrary and is of mala fide character.

The moot question which came before the Court for consideration was whether the report of the FFC is in violation of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 [hereinafter ‘the 1965 Rules’]. After perusing the 1965 Rules, the Court was of the view that inquiry conducted by the FFC is not an inquiry contemplated under Rule 14 of such Rules.

It further held that the report of the FFC provides a prima facie factual underpinning on the basis of which the disciplinary authority considers either to initiate a further ‘disciplinary inquiry’ as provided under Rule 14 of the Rules for imposing major penalties or to drop the proceedings all together. Thus, the FFC inquiry at best can be said to be in the nature of a ‘preliminary inquiry’.

Referring to numerous decisions of the Supreme Court, the Court observed that it is only at the stage of inquiry under Rule 14 that an opportunity of hearing has to be granted. As the FFC merely produced the facts for consideration before the disciplinary authority, such authority has to take an appropriate call and to grant reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.

Therefore, it held that there was no violation of the Rules in constituting the FFC for finding out the facts and issue show-cause notice on the basis of its report. Accordingly, the order passed by the Tribunal was upheld and the writ petition was dismissed.