CASE TITLE : SANJAY KUMAR SARANGI Vs. STATE OF ODISHA AND ANOTHER ET AL
CASE NO : ABLAPL No. 11777 of 2023, 13978 of 2023&13980 of 2023
DATE OF JUDGMENT : April 10, 2024

Criminal Procedure Code – Anticipatory Bail – Maintainability of anticipatory bail applications by persons already in custody – Petitioners in custody for prior IPC and NDPS Act cases apprehending arrest in newly registered cases – Question raised whether Section 438 Cr.P.C. permits such applications – Held, anticipatory bail is maintainable for persons in custody, provided it becomes effective only upon their release and subsequent arrest in the new case, safeguarding liberty under Article 21 – Cr.P.C., 1973, S. 438. Criminal Law – Arrest versus Remand – Distinction between arrest as physical custody by police and remand as judicial custody for investigation – Petitioners argued remand equates to de facto arrest and can be countered with anticipatory bail; State contended remand does not invoke apprehension of arrest – Held, remand differs from arrest but can result in deprivation of liberty akin to arrest; anticipatory bail effective only if petitioner is released and then arrested in the subsequent case – Cr.P.C., 1973, Ss. 41, 46, 167.

Whether a person in custody in connection with a case can seek anticipatory bail in another case registered against him is the point decided in this cases. The three anticipatory bail applications under Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code pertain to distinct but related circumstances involving the petitioners Sanjay Kumar Sarangi and Pratham Patra. Each petitioner was apprehending arrest in connection with specific criminal cases despite being in custody for different cases. The primary question before the court was whether anticipatory bail could be sought by individuals already in custody in other cases. The petitioner in ABLAPL No. 11777 of 2023 was facing charges under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, and 120B IPC related to fraudulent land transactions. He was in custody for a separate case involving similar charges. The petitioners in ABLAPL Nos. 13978 and 13980 of 2023 were apprehending arrest under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act and allied IPC sections. They were in custody for different NDPS-related cases.

It was argued on behalf of the petitioners that the right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution should not be curtailed merely because the accused is already in custody in another case. Tracing the legislative history of Section 438 Cr.P.C., it was emphasized that the provision was introduced to prevent undue harassment and humiliation. It was stressed that anticipatory bail provisions should be liberally construed to protect personal liberty. For specific cases, the counsel highlighted that the petitioners had no direct involvement in the alleged offenses or that evidence linking them was inadmissible.

Conversely, it was argued on behalf of the State that anticipatory bail is inapplicable to those already in custody. The judgment of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Sunil Kallami v. State of Rajasthan (2021) was cited and argued that a person in custody could not seek anticipatory bail for subsequent cases. The State also emphasized the potential misuse of such protection to evade interrogation and investigation.

The court embarked on an analysis of the legislative intent behind Section 438 Cr.P.C. and the constitutional principles underpinning personal liberty. The court acknowledged that anticipatory bail aims to shield individuals from undue harassment, humiliation, and the misuse of arrest powers, aligning with the spirit of Article 21. The statutory provisions were analyzed, highlighting the procedural distinctions between “arrest” and “remand.” The court noted that while a person already in custody cannot technically be “arrested” again, they can be remanded in connection with another case, which would technically curb his liberty.

Referring to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Sushila Aggarwal, the court emphasized that the right to anticipatory bail cannot be curtailed without express statutory limitations. It distinguished the present cases from the judgment in Narinderjit Singh Sahni v. Union of India, where the petitioners were detained across multiple cases and anticipatory bail was deemed inapplicable under those specific circumstances.

The court concluded that anticipatory bail applications are maintainable even for individuals already in custody for another case. However, such an order would have effect only on the accused being “arrested” upon their release in the first case. The court rejected the State’s contention that granting anticipatory bail undermines investigative agencies, clarifying that conditions can be imposed to ensure cooperation during the investigation.

This judgment has significant implications for criminal jurisprudence and personal liberty. By affirming the maintainability of anticipatory bail applications for those in custody in unrelated cases, the court has reinforced the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty and limited the scope for arbitrary actions by investigative agencies. This ensures protection against potential misuse of arrest powers, particularly for individuals facing multiple accusations. Legally, the judgment harmonizes the procedural rights of the accused with the investigative prerogatives of the State, balancing individual rights and public interest.

TRINATH BARIK AND OTHERS.
CASE NO : RSA No. 301 of 2014
DATE OF JUDGMENT : September 27, 2024

(Property Law – Succession – Legal heirship – Inheritance by female Hindu after remarriage – Plaintiff, daughter of Sumitra Barik from her second marriage, claimed inheritance to the properties inherited by her mother from her first husband, Prahallad – Defendant, claiming to be Sumitra’s adopted son, sought to inherit the property – Trial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, rejecting the adoption claim – First Appellate Court reversed, stating the property should revert to Prahallad’s heirs under Section 15(2)(b) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – High Court, analyzing Sections 14 and 15, upheld that Sumitra’s remarriage did not affect her absolute ownership of the inherited property, and the plaintiff, as her daughter from the second marriage, was entitled to inherit – Adoption claim rejected – High Court reaffirmed that under Section 14, a female Hindu’s ownership of inherited property is absolute and unaffected by remarriage – Property of a widow without issue reverts to the heirs of her first husband under Section 15(2)(b) only if she has no issue from the second marriage.

Whether a child born out of re-marriage of a widow has any right over the property inherited by her mother from her husband of the first marriage is the question decided in this appeal. The appeal arose from a judgment by the First Appellate Court that partly reversed the decision of the Trial Court in a property dispute involving the inheritance rights of the plaintiff, Arnapurna Pradhan, over the properties of her mother, Sumitra Barik. Sumitra inherited the properties from her first husband, Prahallad, and subsequently remarried Rameswar Das, from whom she had a daughter, the plaintiff. After Sumitra’s death, the plaintiff claimed absolute ownership of the properties under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, while the defendant, Trinath Barik, asserted inheritance rights as Sumitra’s adopted son and as a legal heir of Prahallad. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, rejecting the defendant’s adoption claim. However, the First Appellate Court reversed the decision, holding that the properties would revert to the heirs of Prahallad under Section 15(2)(b) of the Hindu Succession Act. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court.

The plaintiff argued that under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, Sumitra had become the absolute owner of the properties inherited from Prahallad and that her remarriage did not affect her rights. Consequently, upon Sumitra’s death, the properties devolved to the plaintiff as her sole heir. The plaintiff contended that remarriage does not divest a widow of her absolute ownership.

The defendants, on the other hand, relied on Bhagat Ram v. Teja Singh (2002), arguing that under Section 15(2)(b), properties inherited by a female Hindu from her husband would revert to her husband’s heirs in the absence of any issue from the first marriage. They maintained that the plaintiff, being the daughter from Sumitra’s second marriage, could not claim inheritance from Prahallad’s estate.

The High Court extensively analyzed the interplay between Sections 14 and 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It observed that Section 14(1) grants absolute ownership to a female Hindu over any property possessed by her, regardless of its source. The court underscored that remarriage does not restrict or negate the rights conferred under Section 14(1), as per Cherotte Sugathan v. Cherotte Bharathi (2008). It held that Sumitra’s absolute ownership of the properties remained unaffected by her remarriage to Rameswar.

The court also addressed Section 15(2)(b), which governs the devolution of property inherited from a husband. It clarified that this provision applies only if the widow dies intestate without any issue. In this case, since Sumitra had a daughter, the plaintiff, the properties would not revert to Prahallad’s heirs but devolve upon the plaintiff as Sumitra’s legal heir under the general rules of succession in Section 15(1). The court emphasized that denying inheritance to children from a widow’s second marriage would render Section 14 redundant and contradict its intent to ensure a widow’s independent ownership.

The High Court further rejected the defendant’s adoption claim, affirming the Trial Court’s finding that no valid adoption had occurred. It noted that the First Appellate Court erred by disregarding the plaintiff’s legitimate claim as Sumitra’s sole heir while incorrectly prioritizing the inheritance rights of Prahallad’s extended family.

The High Court set aside the judgment of the First Appellate Court and restored the Trial Court’s decision, declaring the plaintiff the rightful heir to Sumitra’s properties. It held that Sumitra’s absolute ownership under Section 14(1) remained unaffected by her remarriage and that Section 15(2)(b) did not apply due to the presence of a surviving issue.

This judgment reinforces the rights of female Hindus to absolute ownership of inherited property under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, ensuring gender equity in property succession laws. It clarifies the nuanced application of Section 15(2)(b), distinguishing cases of intestate death with and without issue. By upholding the inheritance rights of children from a widow’s subsequent marriage, the decision reflects the progressive intent of the Act to empower women and eliminate archaic limitations on their property rights. This ruling has significant socio-economic implications, safeguarding the property rights of widows and their children, thereby promoting financial stability and gender justice within the family structure.