Gau Gyan Foundation ‘Rudrashram Gaushala’ Vrs. The State of Odisha & Anr.
Case Number: CRLMC No. 1192 of 2022
Date of Decision: 7th February, 2023
There is no absolute bar against interim release of seized cattle in favour
of accused-owner under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act.
The factual matrix leading to the above litigation is that some cattle were rescued while being transported allegedly for illegal slaughtering without proper care and arrangement of water, food and medical aid. The local police seized the cattle and handed it over to the petitioner, a Gaushala, for immediate care and maintenance as the animals were in an extremely weak and miserable condition.
The accused moved the Court of the SDJM, Bhadrak for interim release of the cattle in his favour claiming himself as its owner. Deciding the application, the SDJM released the custody of the cattle to the accused, which was confirmed by the order of the Sessions Judge, Bhadrak.
It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the custody of the cattle could not be handed over to the petitioner, rather, it should have been released for custody by an infirmary, pinjrapole, SPCA, Animal Welfare Organization or Gaushala.
While dealing with such contention, it is observed that the decision with regard to custody of seized animals entirely depends on the conduct and character of the accused and interim custody may be disallowed if the court finds that there is a possibility of further cruelty, in case the animals are handed over to him.
The Court held that discretionary power has been conferred on the Magistrate to deal with release of animals depending on the circumstances of a case and he may even direct release of the cattle in favour of the owner upon satisfaction that such release is unlikely to subject the animals to further cruelty.
Shrikant Mohta Vrs. Republic of India (CBI)
Case Number: CRLMC No. 3407 of 2019
Date of Decision: 30th May, 2023
The Court refused to quash chargesheet against the film-maker for his
alleged role in chit fund scam in connivance with Rose Valley Group.
The petitioner, a film-maker approached the Court with a prayer to quash the chargesheet filed against him under Section(s) 409, 408, 420 and 120-B read with Section(s) 4, 5 and 6 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Scheme (Banning) Act, 1978.
Allegation against the petitioner was that he being the Founder Director of Shri Venkatesh Films Pvt. Ltd. (SVFL) entered into an agreement with Brand Value Communications Limited (BVCL), a sister concern of Rose Valley Group of Companies (RVGC) and assigned it the exclusive broadcasting rights for a period three years on a consideration amount which was partly received from proceeds of chit fund money.
As argued on behalf of the petitioner that it was purely a commercial transaction and the petitioner outrightly denied that he had conspired with the BVCL for promoting the chit fund business floated by the RVGC.
The CBI, on the other hand, alleged that the petitioner was given assurance by the BVCL that there would be no financial crunch in producing episodes of serials as the RVGC floated the scheme which would enable it to receive perennial public funding. Further, it was alleged that petitioner allowed the BVCL to promote the chit fund business of RVGC through advertisement during intermissions of serials and films. However, the petitioner denied all such allegations and submitted that he had no role in telecasting the advertisements as the TV channel was owned by BVCL and not by him and also contended that a commercial transaction is unnecessarily being given a criminal colour.
After hearing the parties, the Court was of the considered view that a piecemeal trial at this stage would not be in the interest of justice keeping in view the fact that there has been an allegation of criminal conspiracy against the petitioner. Accordingly, it asked the Trial Court to take decision regarding culpability on the part of the petitioner at the appropriate stage.
Smt. Pramodini Sahoo v. State (Vigilance)
Case Number: CRLA No. 100 of 2016
Date of Decision: 30th May, 2023
Notice under Section 14(1) of the Orissa Special Courts Act for
confiscation of property can only be issued to ‘person affected’ and
not to ‘such other persons’ as prescribed in Scetion 14(2).
The appellant challenged the order passed by the Authorized Officer, Special Court, Bhubaneswar in a proceeding initiated under Section 13 of the Orissa Special Courts Act, 2006 for confiscation of the schedule properties, whereby, an application to drop the confiscation proceeding was declined.
It was argued on behalf of the appellant that a notice under Section 14(1) of the Act could not have been issued to her as she does not come under the definition of ‘person affected’, rather, fits into the meaning of ‘such other person’ and therefore, the notice should have been issued under Section 14(2) of the Act.
The Court held that the proceeding under the Act is an action meant for confiscation of the assets acquired by any person illegally with a notice to him and a copy thereof served upon others, who holds any such assets on his behalf and observed that the notice is issued to the person affected in Form No. II as per Rule 13(2) of the Rules and no separate form is prescribed
for ‘such other person’ under the Rules since a copy of the notice issued to the ‘person affected’ is only served upon in accordance with the Act, so therefore, Annexure-7, though a form meant for opposite party No.1 but for all intents and purpose is essentially a compliance of Section 14(2) of the Act.
The Court further held that the appellant may be proceeded with even though she is not a public servant or criminally prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act but considering the very purpose and scheme of the Act, the contention of the appellant cannot be accepted to scuttle the proceeding against her on such a ground. Further, it was held that the action is fundamentally for confiscation of the proceeds of the crime, hence, the issuance of notice to the appellant is to be read as and with reference to compliance of Section 14(2) of the Act. The Court finally concluded that the appellant is to be treated as ‘such other person’ and not a ‘person affected’ for the purpose of the action under the Act.
Adarsha Pathagar v. The Manager (TS) Land, Rourkela Steel Plant & Ors.
Case Number: W.P.(C) No. 9076 of 2021
Date of Decision: 2nd September, 2023
Renewal of lease deed connotes entering into a fresh agreement and therefore,
rents/charges on old rates cannot be demanded while seeking it.
The petitioner ‘Adarsha Pathagar’ filed the writ petition challenging the initiation and continuance of the eviction proceeding against it under the Odisha Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971.
The petitioner had got the land on lease from opposite party No.1 in 1974 for 30 years. The lease period came to an end in the year 2004, after which, opposite party No.1 asked the petitioner to enter into a fresh lease on revised rates. The recommendation made by the Sub- Lease Committee in this respect received the Government approval subject to the condition that the petitioner clears the arrears.
It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that opposite party No.1 has put up unreasonable terms and conditions since has been asked to enter into a fresh lease on revised rates. Further, it was contended that the eviction proceeding initiated against the petitioner is illegal.
The Court referring to the ruling of the Apex Court in the case of Ashoka Marketing Ltd. & Another Vrs. Punjab National Bank & Others (1990) 4 SCC 406, wherein, the meaning of ‘unauthorized occupation’ was elucidated. Having regard for the observations made therein, the Court held that the petitioner has been unauthorizedly occupying the disputed land as the lease was never renewed after its expiry in 2004 and therefore, initiation of eviction proceeding was held to be in accordance with law.
The Court also held that renewal of the lease deed connotes initiation of a fresh agreement and not merely the extension of the old one. Therefore, it opined that when a fresh agreement is sought to be made on renewal, the petitioner cannot demand the same to be executed as per the old rates.
Resultantly, the parties were asked to enter into a fresh lease deed and it was made clear that the same cannot be objected or opposed to by the petitioner by not accepting the terms. At the same time, liberty was granted to the parties for reaching at a consensus on the charges leviable for the sub-lease to be freshly executed.
Gond painting displayed in Judges’ Lounge